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McMahon: International Law

INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN RE MEXICO CITY AIRCRASH: PRIVATE RIGHTS OF
ACTION UNDER THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT AND
THE WARSAW CONVENTION

A.

INTRODUCTION

The Ninth Circuit held in In re Mexico City Aircrash/ that
persons qualifying as "passengers" may bring an action for
wrongful deathS under the Warsaw Convention. 3
In 1979, a Western Airlines jetliner crash landed at the
Mexico City Airport killing seventy-four persons aboard the
plane.· Western employees Theresa Haley, Regina Tovar, and
Vikki Dzidall were among the victims. Haley and Tovar were on
duty as flight attendants8 and Dzida was en route to her scheduled assignment on another flight departing from Mexico City.7
Representatives of the three decedents sued Western Air1. 708 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1983) (per Fletcher J., the other panel members were
Pregerson, J., and Reinhardt, J.).
.
2. It is imperative to have a statutory or treaty basis in which to ground a wrongful
death suit because the traditional common law rule in the United States recognized no
cause of action for wrongful death. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 127 (1971).
3. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, October 12, 1929, (as adopted by the U.S. at 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No.
876) [hereinafter cited as the Warsaw Convention]. Although the United States was not
a party to the Warsaw Conference, the Department of State sent observers to the proceedings. On April 17, 1934, President Roosevelt transmitted the Warsaw Convention to
the Senate. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting a Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules, S. EXEC. Doc. No. G, 73d cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1934).
The United States Senate gave its consent to the Convention on June 15, 1934 and it
became law. The Convention has since been revised by the Hague Protocol in 1955, the
Guadalajara Convention in 1961, the Guatemala Protocol in 1971, and, most recently, the
four Additional Montreal Protocols in 1975. See generally Pogust, The Warsaw Convention - Does It Create a Cause of Action?, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 366, 366 n.2, (1978).
4, 708 F.2d at 403.
5.Id.
6. Id. During the flight Haley and Tovar received full pay and full flight time credit.
7. Id. Dzida, while flying to her scheduled assignment received 100% of normal
flight duty pay and 50% credit against her hourly duty assignment for that month.
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lines and other defendants8 claiming damages for death and loss
of property. 9 Western moved to dismiss the suits lO alleging that
the decedents, as Western employees, were provided with an exclusive remedy under the California worker's compensation
statute. l l
Plaintiffs opposed the motion ll based on the California dual
capacity doctrine,13 the Federal Aviation Act14 and the Warsaw
Convention. III
The district court granted Western's motion to dismiss,
holding that all three decedents were acting within the course
and scope of their employment at the time of the crash, and that
the. plaintiffs were limited to the exclusive remedies of the California Labor Code. 18
Plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit contending that
genuine issues of material fact were presented with respect to
their causes of action, and that dismissal of their claims was
erroneous. 17
8. The other defendants included: McDonnell Douglas Co., Inc.; Estate of Charles
Gilbert; Sperry-Rand, Inc.; Sunstrand Data Control, Inc.; Bendix Corporation, Flight
Systems Division; Rockwell International, Inc.; Collins Air Transport Division; and,
Thompson, C.F.S. 1d. at 400.
9. 708 F .2d at 403.
10. The district court's judgment did not indicate whether the dismissals were for
failure to state a claim pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)6 or for summary judgment
under FED. R. CIV. P. 5(B)a. The judgments were based on Western's affidavits. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit interpreted them as summary judgments. 708 F.2d at 404 n.3.
11. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3201-3213 (West 1976).
12. Plaintiff Dzida also opposed the motion to dismiss on the ground that his decedent was not aboard the flight in her capacity as a Western employee and, therefore, was
not limited to a worker's compensation remedy. 708 F.2d at 403.
13. Under this doctrine, an employer may become liable in tort if in addition to his
capacity as employer there is a second capacity which confers on him obligations independent of those imposed as employer. Douglas v. E & J Gallo Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d
103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977).
14. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1976).

15. See supra note 3.
16. See supra note 11.
17. 708 F.2d at 402.
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BACKGROUND

The Federal Aviation Act
The Federal Aviation Act18 governs civil aviation within the
jurisdiction of the United States. Although the general intent of
the Act is to promote the safety of air travelers,19 the Act does
not expressly create a private right of action for persons injured
as a result of violations of the Act. 20
1.

Although the Ninth Circuit has never directly determined
whether a private right of action may be implied from safety
provisions of the Act,lll the court in Sanz v. Renton Aviation,
Inc.,iI held that the personal representatives of decedents killed
in an air crash could not maintain a cause of action under the
ActlS against the owner-lessor for the negligence of the pilotlessee.14 The court reasoned that extending liability to the owner-lessor would have little impact on the Act's underlying policy
of safety,211 and noted that if Congress had intended to create a
civil remedy, one would have been expressly provided for in the
Act. 18

In World Airways, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters,27 the Ninth Circuit held that the authority of a labor
arbitrator to shape a remedy in a pilot dispute was limited by
18. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552.
19. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1432 (1976 Supp. IV 1980). These provisions confer extensive
powers upon the Secretary of Transportation to prescribe standards and regulations regarding nUlllerous aspects of civil aviation for the purpose of promoting safety. Pursuant
to this subchapter the secretary has promulgated comprehensive rules and guidelines
published in Volume 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
20. No intent is explicitly manifested in the Act's legislative history. 708 F.2d at
406.

21. [d. at 405.
22. 511 F.2d 1027 (9th Cir. 1975). In Sanz, the personal representatives of persons
killed in a light plane crash sued the agency from which the plane was rented. Plaintiffs
asserted that the pilot was not competent to fly and that his deficiencies could have been
discovered through greater diligence on the part of the rental company's agents.
23. 511 F.2d at 1029.
24. [d. at 1028-29. The plaintiffs based their argument on 49 U.S.C. § 1301(26)
(1958).
25. [d.
26. [d.
27. 578 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1978). This case was an appeal from a district court judgment which vacated part of an arbitration award. The award required World Airways,
Inc. to retrain and then provide an opportunity to requalify a pilot who had been demoted for repeated errors in judgment.
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the policy of the Federal Aviation Act.1l8 The court refused to
imply a private right of action based on provisions of the Act
unrelated to safety.29
Other circuits similarily have concluded that no right of action may be implied from the Act's· safety related provisions. 30
Additionally, a number of circuits have refused to find a private
right of action based on provisions of the Act unrelated to
safety.31 The majority of recent district court decisions that have
examined whether private rights of action can be implied from
the safety and non-safety related provisions of the Act have also
held that no such right exists. 82
The district court decisions holding that a private right of
action can be implied from the Federal Aviation Act have relied
on the Act's savings clause. s8 However, in Middlesex County v.
28. Id. at 801.
29. The court stated that Congress had directed the Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration to ensure air carriers performed their services with the highest
degree of safety. Id. at 803. The court noted that "failure of an airline to comply with the
provisions of the. . . Act and its regulations. . . can result in. . . civil penalties against
the carrier." Id. In Mexico City Aircrash, the Ninth Circuit stated that this language
does not suggest that the Federal Aviation Act contains a private right of action. 708
F.2d at 406.
30. For example, in Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc., 548 F.2d 452, 457-58 (3d Cir.
1976), that court found no private right of action for potential air crash victims. However, the court did not explicitly decide whether actual victims of air disasters may maintain a '<8use of action.
31. In Diefenthal v. C.A.B., 681 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, _ U.S. _
(1983), the court held that no private right of action existed under the Federal Aviation
Act whereby passengers could sue the carrier for failing to provide seats for plaintiff in
the smoking section of the aircraft. In Kodish v. United Airlines Inc., 628 F.2d 1301
(10th Cir. 1950) an unsuccessful applicant for a pilot position was denied a cause of
action for age discrimination under the Federal Aviation Act.
32. The majority view states it is improper to infer a private right of action from the
Federal Aviation Act. In Obenshain v. Halliday, 504 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Va. 1980), the
court held that the representative of a passenger killed in an airplane crash due to the
failure of runway lights had no wrongful death cause of action based on the Federal
Aviation Act. See also Heckel v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 467 F. Supp. 278 (W.D. Pa. 1979);
Yelinek v. Worlev, 284 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Va. 1968); Moungey v. Brandt, 250 F. Supp.
445 (W.D. Wis. 1966).
33. The minority view is represented by Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350F. Supp.
612 (C.D. Cal. 1972) and In re Paris Aircrash, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975). In
Gabel, the court concluded that the representatives of decedents killed in an air crash
could maintain a cause of action against the common carrier. 350 F. Supp. at 612. The
holding was based on the congressional emphasis on safety found throughout the Act. Id.
at 617. However, the court also relied on the savings clause, incorporated in the Act, in
making its decision. The court stated that the wrongs prohibited in the Act's safety re-
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National Sea Clammers Association,s. the Supreme Court reversed a lower court's holding which found an implied right of
action based on a savings clause, found in a federal regulatory
statute. SG The Court held that the lower court incorrectly relied
on the savings clause in finding a cause of action, because the
main emphasis of the Act was an administrative regulation and
enforcement. S6

In Cort v. Ash,S? the United States Supreme Court developed a four step analysis to be used in determining when a cause
of action may be implied from a federal regulatory statute. The
Cort analysis inquires whether: (1) the plaintiff is a part of the
class for whose benefit the statute was enacted; (2) there is an
indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit,' either to create or deny such a remedy; (3) it is consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy;
and (4) the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state
law, in an area basically the concern of the states, so that it
would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on
federal law. S8 Lower courts presently employ the Cort analysis to
determine whether a private remedy can be implied from a fedlated provisions are cumulative with respect to state remedies. Id. The savings clause
states that "nothing contained in this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but . . . are in addition to such remedies." 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1976). Congress has never expanded on the meaning of this
section. See H.R. REP. No. 2360, 85th Cong., 2a Sess. 18-19, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS 3741, 3758; H.R. REP. No. 2254, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 11-12 (1938). In
Paris Air Crash, a passenger airplane taking off from Paris, France, crashed in France,
and killed all the passengers and employees on board the aircraft: Two hundred and
three suits, arising from the air crash, were filed in the Federal District Court for the
Central District of California. The major claim alleged in the suits was for strict product
liability against General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas. The court concluded that
there was a clearly articulated federal right to enforce a cause of action for wrongful
death arising from operation of an unsafe aircraft. 399 F. Supp. at 748.
34. 453 U.S. 1 (1981). Plaintiffs brought suit in the district court, against officials
from New York and New Jersey alleging damage to the fishing grounds. Plaintiffs alleged
the damage was caused by ocean dumping of sewage. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and
declaratory relief and compensatory and punitive damages.
35. Id. at 11.
36. Id. at 15-17.
37. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In Cort, a stockholder brought suit seeking damages in favor
of Bethlehem Steel Corporation and for injunctive relief. The claim was in connection
with advertisements made during the 1972 Presidential election which were paid for
from the general corporate funds. Plaintiff alleged this violated federal law which prohibits corporations from making contributions in specified federal elections.
38. Id. at 78.
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eral regulatory statute. 39

2. The Warsaw Convention
The Warsaw Convention was drafted with the intent of creating a uniform body of law to govern the liability of air carriers
in international air transportation. 40 The legislative history of
the Convention indicates that the drafters did not directly address the issue of whether the treaty creates a cause of action for
personal injury or wrongful death. 41
However, Article 17 of the Convention provides in part that
the carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of
death, wounding, or bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the
accident causing the injury took place on board the aircraft.42
This section has been construed to create a cause of action for
both wrongful death and personal injury,,3
In Choy v. Pan-American Airways CO.,44 a claim for wrongful death based on the Warsaw Convention was disallowed,, 11
. The district court held that the treaty was not enforceable in the
United States without an enabling act either creating a cause of
39. See, In Re Paris Aircrash, supra note 33. See generally, Crawford & Schneider,
The Implied Private Cause of Action and the Federal Aviation Act: A Practical Application of Cort v. Ash, 23 ILL. L. REV. 657 (1978).
40. The Convention's preamble states that the signatories "have recognized the advantage of regulating in a uniform manner the conditions of international transportation
by air." 49 Stat. 3014, T.S. No. 876 (1934) (unofficial translation). The need to establish
uniform rules resulted in the First International Conference on Private Aeronautical Law
at Paris in 1952. The delegates at Paris established the Comite International Technique
d'Experts Juridique Aeriens (CITEJA), a committee assigned the task of drafting inter. national agreements regarding international air law. After debate whether a cause of action could be created through an international convention, CITEJA decided that a earrier would be liable for damages due to wrongful death or physical injury. In addition,
any actions for liability against a carrier were required to be based on CITEJA rules.
The Warsaw delegates accepted the CITEJA draft as their source document. After eight
days of debate the draft took its final form as the Warsaw Convention. See Pogust,
supra note 3 at 366-67.
41. The issue of a cause of action for damages was, however, discussed in general
terms.Id.
42. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. XVII.
43. Salamon v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij, N.V., 107 N.Y.S.2d 768 (Sup.
Ct. 1951) aff'd mem., 281 A.D. 965, 120 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1953).
44. 1941 A.M.C. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). In Choy, plaintiff, as administrator of decedent's estate, sued for the wrongful death of a passenger killed in the crash of a seaplane
which was crossing the Pacific Ocean.
45. Id. at 487-488.
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action or naming those who could sue for a passenger's death. 48
However, in Salamon v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij, N. V.,.' the court reached the opposite result. 48 The
court held that the Convention created a cause of action, and
that the plaintiff could sue for the wrongful death of her deceased spouse based on Article 17.49 The court reasoned that if
the convention did not create a cause of action in Article 17, it
would be difficult to understand the reasons for Article 17's
existence. llo
In Kamlos v, Compagnie National~ Air France,lIl the court
rejected the Salamon conclusion,1I2 based on the text of a letter
from Secretary of State Cordell Hull to President Roosevelt
describing the Convention. Hull's letter stated that Article 17
created only a presumption of liability against the aerial carrier
upon the happening of an accident. 1I3 The court concluded that
the law of the forum supplied the only possible cause of action
since one was not provided for in the Convention.1I4
In Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana,1I11 the Second

Cir~

46. [d. at 488. In Wyman v. Pan-American Airways, Inc., 181 Misc. 963, 43 N.Y.S.2d
420 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd, 267 A.D. 947,48 N.Y.S.2d 459, aff'd, 293 N.Y. 878, 59 N.E.2d
785 (1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 882 (1945), the court followed the Choy holding. The
court did not elaborate with any further rationale for declining to find a cause of action
in the Convention. The court stated that the Convention did not create new substantive
rights, but operated within the framework of existing rights and remedies.
47. See supra note 43.
48. [d. at 770-71.
49. [d.
50. [d. at 773.
51. 111F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 820 (1954).
52. 111 F. Supp. at 401-02.
53. The letter was important because it was a summary of the Convention's provisions based on the reports of U.S. observers, present at the proceedings. Secretary Hull
wrote:
"The effect of Article 17 . . . of the Convention is to create a
presumption of liability against the aerial carrier on the mere
happening of an accident occasioning injury or death of a passenger subject to certain defenses allowed under the Convention to the aerial carrier."
Message from the President of the United States Transmitting a Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules, S. EXEC. Doc. No. G, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1934), reprinted in 1934 U.S. Av. 239, 243-44.
54. 111 F. Supp. at 402.
55. 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957). Noel involved an action
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cuit followed Kamlos, and held that the Convention did not create a cause of action for wrongful death. ~6 Twenty-one years
later, the Second Circuit, in Benjamins v. British European Airways,~'1 reversed its decision in Noel. In reversing the Noel decision, the court noted that the overriding goal of the Convention
was to formulate a uniform set of rules governing international
air transportation.~8 Thus, it was inconsistent with the spirit of
the treaty to require a plaintiff to find an independent domestic
cause of action. ~9
In making its decision, the court relied on the First Circuit's
opinion in Seth v. British Overseas Airways Corp.,60 and Article
30(3) of the Convention. 61 In Seth, the court held that Article
30(3) created a cause of action for the loss, damage, or delay of
baggage during carriage by successive air carriers. 62 Although the
language of Article 30(3) and Article 17 substantially differed,
the court reasoned that if a cause of action was created under
Article 30(3), the intent of the drafters was to create a cause of
action throughout the Act, including Article 17.63
The Second Circuit also noted that Great Britain was the
only other Warsaw signatory which had a common law rule
against wrongful death recovery.6' Shortly after the Convention's ratification, the treaty was incorporated into Britain's nationallaws.6~ By including supplemental provisions,66 a wrongful
death cause of action was created in Article 17. The Benjamins
by the executors of decedent's estate against a corporation owned by the United States
of Venezuela for damages for wrongful death. The decedent was killed in an air crash in
the Atlantic Ocean 30 miles from New Jersey.
56. Id. at 680.
57. 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979).
58. Id. at 917-918.
59.Id.
60. 329 F.2d 302 (1st Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 858 (1964). In Seth, passengers sued British Overseas Airways Corporation for loss of baggage.
61. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. XXX(iii). Article XXX(iii) states:
"As regards baggage or goods, the passenger or consignor who is entitled to delivery shall
have a right of action against the last carrier. . . . "
62. 329 F.2d at 305.
63.Id.
64. 572 F.2d at 918-19.
65. This was done through the Carriage by Air Act, 1932. 22 & 23 Geo. 5, ch. 36,
reprinted in C. SHAWCROSS & K. BEAUMONT, AIR LAW 681-92 app. 2 (2d ed. 1951).
66. See Provisions as to Liability of Carrier in the Event of the Death of a Passenger 22 & 23 Geo. 5, ch. 36, sched. 2 (1932). [d. at 692.
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court reasoned that the British implementation scheme raised
the inference that the British delegates to the Convention believed Article 17 created its own cause of action. 67 In light of
Britain's apparent treatment of Article 17, the court concluded
that the provision should be construed similarly to create a
cause of action in the United StateS. 68

3. California's Worker's Compensation Law
The California Worker's Compensation ActS9 is a compulsory statute 70 establishing an exclusive system of compensation
for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. 7~
Under certain circumstances, Federal law will override the state
statute and provide the remedy for recovery.72 For example, in
Smith u. Canadian Pacific Airways, Ltd.,78 the Second Circuit
noted that because the Warsaw Convention is a treaty, and is
the supreme law of the land it preempted local worker's com. pensation law. 7•
The worker's compensation law also may be inapplicable
where an employee is acting outside the scope of employment at
the time of the injury. In Demanes v. United Air Lines,75 personal representatives sued United for the death of four pilots
who were killed in an air crash while commuting between Los
Angeles and Denver. 7s The court held that the pilots' representatives were not limited to a worker's compensation remedy because the pilots were passengers for the purposes of liability
when the accident occurred." The fact that the pilots were commuting was critical to the determination that they were not acting as employees. 78
67. 572 F.2d at 918-19.
68.Id.
69. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3201-3213 (West 1976).
70. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3700 (West 1976).
71. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601 (West 1976).
72. Article VI of the United States Constitution provides that the laws of the
United States and all treaties made under the authority of the United States shall be the
supreme law of the land. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
73. 452 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1971).
74. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
75. 348 F. Supp. 13 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
76. Id. at 14.
77.Id.
78.Id.
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THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

The Ninth Circuit used the four part test articulated in
Cort79 to determine that the Federal Aviation Act contains no
implied private right of action. 80 Considering the first inquiry,
whether the plaintiffs were part of the class for whose benefit
the statute was enacted,81 the court stated the legislation was
enacted to promote safety in aviation and to protect persons
traveling aboard aircraft. 811 This purpose was effectuated by requiring the Secretary of Transportation to prescribe minimum
standards for the design and operation of aircraft. 83 The court
79. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
80. 708 F.2d at 408.
81. [d. at 406.
82. [d.
83. The minimum standards provided for by the Act are found in 49 U.S.C. § 1421.
It provides in relevant part:
Minimum standards; rules and regulations
(a) The Administrator is empowered and it shall be his duty
to promote safety of flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by
prescribing and revising from time to time:
(1) Such minimum standards governing the design,
materials, workmanship, construction, and performance
of aircraft, aircraft engines, and propellers as may be
required in the interest of safety;
(2) Such minimum standards governing appliances as
may be required in the interest of safety;
(3) Reasonable rules and regulations and minimum
standards governing, in the interest of safety, (a) the inspection, servicing and overhaul of aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, and appliances; (b) the equipment and
facilities for such inspection, servicing, and overhaul;
and (c) in the discretion of the Administrator, the periods for, and the manner in which such inspection, servicing, and overhaul shall be made including provision
for examinations and reports by properly qualified private persons whose examinations or reports the Secretary of Transportation may accept in lieu of those made
by its officers and employees;
.(4) Reasonable rules and regulations governing the reserve supply of aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, appliances, and aircraft fuel and oil, required in the interest of safety, including the reserve supply of aircraft
fuel and oil which shall be carried in flight;
(5) Reasonable rules and regulations governing, in the
interest of safety, the maximum hours or periods of service of airmen, and other employees, of air carriers; and
(6) Such reasonable rules and regulations or minimum
standards, governing other practices, methods, and procedure, as the Administrator may find necessary to pro-
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reasoned that since Congress intended to protect everyone traveling aboard the aircraft, the decedents could not be excluded
from the protected class simply because they were employees. 84
Accordingly, the court determined the first element of the Cort
test was fulfilled. 811
The court, in applying the second requirement of Cort, inquired into the legislative history to determine whether or not
Congress intended to create a remedy for damages. Noting that
. the emphasis of the Act was on administrative regulation and
enforcement,86 the court found no evidence of congressional intent to create a .remedy for damages. 87 The court followed the
basic rule of statutory construction which disallows implication
of other remedies where a statute expressly provides for a particular remedy. 88
The Court, citing the Supreme Court decision in Middlesex,
rejected the plaintiff's contention that a private right of action
was created by the presence of the savings clause incorporated
in the Act. 89 The Act's emphasis on administrative regulation
and enforcement,90 in combination with the absence of legisla- .
tive intent to create a private right of action, led the court to
determine that the second and most significant element of the
Cort test was not satisfied. 91 Because this element failed, the
court found it unnecessary to examine the remaining Cort factors and concluded the Act contained no implied private right of
action.
In the second part of its analysis92 the court inquired
vide adequately for national security and safety in air
commerce.
[d.

84. 708 F.2d at 406.
85. [d .
. 86. [d at 407.
87. [d.
88. [d. at 407.
89. 708 F.2d at 407.
90. The court found that the Federal Aviation Act created an extensive statutory
enforcement scheme allowing civil penalties to be levied for violations of the Act. The
statute also authorized the Secretary of Transportation to seek injunctive relief to compel compliance. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1471, 1487 (1976).
91. 708 F.2d at 408.
92. [d.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1984

11

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 10

172 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:161

whether the Wars8w Convention created only a uniform set of
legal rules to govern international air transportation, or also created a right to recover for injuries or death based on Article 17.98
The Ninth Circuit, relying upon the reasoning of Benjamins,94
concluded that persons qualifying as "passengers" within the
meaning of the treaty can recover for injuries or death based on
Article 17.9&
According to the court, the language of Article 17 stating
that "the carrier shall be liable"96 demonstrates that the Convention drafters intended to create a cause of action for injured
or killed passengers. 97 The court determined that it was unlikely
the language was intended to create only a presumption of liability to be employed solely in actions available under domestic
law. 98 The court reasoned that since a statute of limitations provision was incorporated in Article 2999 of the Convention, a right
of action was necessarily established subject to the limitation period. loo The court stated that if the drafters of the Convention
intended that only domestic law be the source of a plaintiff's
action, it would not have incorporated such a provision. lol The
court also pointed out that the language of Article 29 speaks of
"the right of damages," implying that a cause of action is cre93. [d. at 409.
94. 572 F.2d 913.
95. The Ninth Circuit had never examined the Benjamins holding prior to Mexico
City Aircrash. However, in Dunn v. Trans World Airways, Inc., 589 F.2d 408, 411-12 (9th
Cir. 1978), the Ninth Circuit noted that the Benjamins rule contradicts the previous
. majority rule but it was not necessary for the court to determine whether Benjamins
should be followed.
96. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. XVII.
97. 798 F.2d at 412.
98. [d.

99. Article XXIX states: "(1) The right to damages shall be extinguished if an action is not brought within 2 years, reckoned from the date of arrival at the destination,
or from the date on which the aircraft ought to have arrived, or from the date on which
the transportation stopped." See Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. XXIX.
100. 708 F.2d at 412.
101. The court also pointed to the official French text of the Convention. The first
portion of article XXIX in the French text reads, "(1) 'action an responsabilite' doit etre
intente, sous peine de decheance, dans Ie delai de deux ans. . . . 49 Stat. at 3007, T.S.
NO. 86 at 8. The court stated that a literal translation of this language would be, "[tlhe
action for liability must be brought within two years, else it lapses." 708 F.2d at 412. The
court said: "By speaking in this way of the action of liability and not merely in terms of
an action for liability subject to the Convention, the article shows that the Convention
creates cause of action." [d.
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ated by the Convention. 102
The court also examined Article 24,103 previously relied
upon by courts to deny a cause of action under Article 17.104 The
court interpreted the "without prejudice" language of the Article
to be the result of uncertainty among the Convention delegates
concerning the attributes of the right they created. 1011 The delegates realized that several claimants might attempt to collect
damages on behalf of a single dead passenger in different forums. 10tl Therefore, the meaning of this provision was left intentionally vague. The court interpreted this ambiguity to mean
that eligibility for recovery on wrongful death was a question for
the law of the forum; it was not to be viewed as evidence that
the Convention did not create a cause of action. l07 The court
stated that the only real question was whether the indefiniteness
of Article 24, concerning the identity of persons entitled to recover, precludes finding a right of action. l08
The court citing Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,t°9
which overruled the traditional common law rule prohibiting
wrongful death actions; except those with specific statutory authorization,llo held that difficulty in ascertaining persons entitled to recovery did not preclude finding of a cause of action for
1'02. [d.

103. Article XXIV states:
(1) In the cases covered by Articles 18 and 19 any action for
damages, however founded, can only be brought subject to the
conditions and limits set out in this Convention. (2) In the
cases covered by Article 17 the provisions of the preceding
paragraph shall also apply, without prejudice to the questions
as to who are the persons who have the right to bring suit and
what are their respective rights.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. XXIV.
104. See Pogust, supra note 3, at 373.
105. 708 F.2d at 413-14.
106. [d.
107. [d.
108. [d.

109. 398 U.S. 375 (1970). In Moragne, the Court considered a situation where a
longshoreman had been killed while working aboard a vessel within Florida territorial
waters. Defendants moved to dismiss the case on the ground that federal statutory law
provided no recovery for wrongful death in a state's territorial waters, and that Florida's
wrongful death statute did not recognize unseaworthiness as a theory of recovery. The
Court rejected this argument and held that a wrongful death action can be maintained
under federal maritime law even without specific statutory authorization. [d. at 376.
110. [d. at 388-92.
.
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wrongful death. I I I Therefore, a wrongful death action could be
based on Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention although there is
no specific statutory authorization to being such a suit.
The court next considered whether the cause of action created by the Convention was available to the plaintiffs. ll2 To allow recovery under Article 17, plaintiffs' decedents had to qualifyas "passengers" within the meaning of the section. Plaintiffs
argued that they qualified as passengers within the meaning of
Article 17 because Article 1 makes the Convention applicable to
persons receiving "gratuitous transportation."u3
The panel held that the two flight attendants were not passengers within the meaning of Article 17.114 Their flights were
not for the principal purpose of moving from one point to another but for the exclusive purpose of performing their employment duties. 1111 Thus, the court held that the summary judgments on the claims of the two flight attendants were proper. US
The court reached a contrary conclusion in regard to the
claim of Vikki Dzida's representative. 1l7 Because Dzida was a
Los Angeles based employee traveling to Mexico City to take
duty aboard a plane departing from that location, the court held
that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether or not
she was receiving "transportation" as a "passenger" aboard that
flight. U8 The court stated that the record was insufficient to
show that Dzida was not, as a matter of law, a passenger aboard
the airplane. 119 The critical inquiry was whether Dzida was commuting or if she was contractually obligated to be on board the
flight.120 The court stated that if she was in fact commuting,
Ill. 708 F.2d at 415.
112. 708 F.2d at 416.
. 113. [d. at 416-17. Article I states, in part: "(1) This Convention shall apply to all
international transportation of persons, baggage, or goods performed by aircraft for hire.
It shall apply equally to gratuitous transportation by aircraft performed by an air transportation enterprise." Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 1.
.
114. 708 F.2d at 417.
115. [d.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
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then she probably qualified as a passenger. 121 The summary
judgment entered against Dzida therefore, was erroneous and
was reversed. 122
The court also considered Western's contention that any
cause of action available to the plaintiffs under federal law was
subordinate to California's worker's compensation remedy.123
Western, citing King v. Pan American Airways124 and Stoddardo
v. Ling-Temco- Vought, Inc.,m, argued that the worker's compensation remedy was the sole remedy available for the death of
an employee acting in the course and scope of employment. 126
In rejecting Western's contention, the court noted that the
holding in Demanes127 directly contradicted Western's argument. The court also distinguished both King and Stoddard
from the present case, in that the former involved suits commenced under the Death on the High Seas By Wrongful Act, an
Act which expressly provides that state statutes giving or regulating any right of action are not affected by its provisions. 128
The Warsaw Convention, which creates. a cause of action
founded in federal treaty law, 129 contains no such provision.
Therefore it preempts any provision of local law which purports
to limit the recovery allowed by t~e Convention; 130
D.

CRITIQUE

The Ninth Circuit, in Mexico City Aircrash, is the first circuit to directly examine the issue of whether or not the Federal
Aviation Act contains· an implied right of action for wrongful
death. In holding that no wrongful death cause of action may be
implied from the Act, the court followed the general trend not to
impute private remedies to federal regulatory statutes absent evidence of congressional intent to create such a right. 131
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id.
Id.
270 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 928 (1960).
513 F. Supp. 314 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
708 F.2d at 418.
348 F. Supp. 13 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
46 U.S.C. § 767 (1976).
708 F.2d at 412.
Id. at 418.
See supra note 34.
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Under the first part of the Cort analysis, the court properly
recognized that both airline passengers and employees were part
of the contemplated benefitted class of the legislation. 132 The
major emphasis of the Act is on safety. By applying minimum
maintenance and operational standards l33 the aircraft is made
safer for both passengers and employees. 134
• In the second part of the Cort analysis,1311 the court correctly
determined that there was no congressional intent to create a
federal cause of action. Moreover, under Middlesex,136 the necessary intent could not be implied from the Act's savings clause. 13?'
The focus of the Act is on administrative regulation and enforcement. 138 If Congress had intended to create a cause of action, the intent would be manifested in the Act or its legislative
history. In the absence of any explicit legislative authority it
would be improper for the court to assume the legislative role of
creating such a remedy.13B Absent compelling evidence of affirmative congressional intent, a federal court should not infer a pri132. It is not disputed, even by those who argue against an implied cause of action
from the Federal Aviation Act that passengers were to be the intended beneficiaries of
this legislation. This conclusion is based on the extensive statutory scheme related to
safety. Douglas, Air Disaster Litigation Without Diversity, 45 J. AIR. L. & COM. 411,447
(1980).
133. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1432 (1976).
134. A plaintiff cannot even argue for an implied right of action unless he can identify a violation of the provisions of 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1976), or the regulations
promulgated pursuant to the legislation dealing with safety. The plaintiff must also assert the violation has caused the crash out of which the suit arises. See Douglas, supra
note 132, at 447.
135. This is the most important factor in the Cort analysis because it goes directly
to the question of whether Congress intended to create a federal" cause of action. However, the other three factors are also helpful in answering the question. See Crawford
and Schneider, supra note 39, at 674.
136. 455 U.S. I, 9 (1981).
137. 708 F.2d at 407.
138. [d.
139. There is evidence that members of Congress do not believe that any private
right of action exists in the Act. In 1968 and 1969 Congress considered bills that would
have created an exclusive federal private cause of action arising out of certain aircraft
crashes. See generally, Note, Aircraft Crash Litigation, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1052
(1970). However, "the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one." Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 666 n.8 (1980).
Congress has never expanded on the meaning of the savings clause. However, in Obenshain v. Halliday, 504 F. Supp. 946, 950 (E.D. Va. 1980), the court stated that the section
is not intended to create a private cause of action but simply to preserve state causes of
action.
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vate cause of action.
The Ninth Circuit's determination that Article 17 created a
private right of action is inappropriate because it ignores Congress' intent to limit federal jurisdiction in Convention cases. 140
The court overreached its jurisdiction, as the decision encroaches upon the executive and legislative functions of the federal government to create and define the international laws to
which the United States is bound.141
Article 6, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution states
that treaties made under the authority of the United States are
the supreme law of the land.142 However, this clause has been
interpreted to apply only to self-executing treaties which need
no further act of Congress to be effective. 143 Where some addi. tional act of Congress is necessary to give effect to the treaty, it
is not operative. w Therefore, even if the Convention purported
to create a cause of action, unless the provisions are self-executing, or' supplemen~ry legislation has been adopted, a cause of
action would not be effective in the United States.1411 No statutory cause of action based on the Warsaw Convention has been
adopted by Congress. 148 Therefore, in the absence of supplementary legislation, Article 17 must be self-executing in order to create. a cause of action.
Examination of Article 17 reveals that there is no provision
providing for those entitled to bring suit.14? Additionally, as the
rights provided by the Convention are contractual,148 and are
personal to the passenger, legislation would be necessary for the
right to survive a passenger's death.14s Article 17 has not been
supplemented with this type of legislation. Therefore, the Article is incomplete because it provides only for inchoate liability.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

See generally W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 166·91 (3d ed. 1971).
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
See Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
Id.
See Pogust, supra note 3, at 371 n.34.
Id.
See Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. XVII.
Id.
Id.
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The Ninth Circuit's reliance on Benjamins is inappropriate
for four reasons. First, the Benjamins court did not fully determine whether Article 17 contains a self-executing provision. lIIO
Although the language of Article 17 that "the carrier shall be
liable," suggests an intent to create a cause of action, the Article
fails to articulate the terms and conditions necessary to all,?w
recovery. 1111
Secondly, the Benjamins decision is unsupported since the
Benjamins court's assertion that the Convention should be applied uniformlyllill is not compelled by the text of the treaty. illS
For example, Article 21 provides that the law of the forum court
determines whether the negligence of a passenger will reduce' his
recovery by a degree comparable to his own fault. I 114 Under Article 24, the determination of who possesses the right of action for
wrongful death and the damages recoverable is also a question
for federal law. m Article 22 limits a carrier's liability for the
death or wounding of a passenger except where the carrier is
guilty of willful misconduct.lCI6 Article 25 leaves the definition of
willful misconduct to the law of the forum. 1CI7
Thirdly, the interpretation of Seth lll8 in Benjamins is incor150. Under the traditional approach, a treaty is self-executing whenever its provisions prescribe a rule by which rights of private citizens may be determined. Dreyfus v.
Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976). A treaty may be
self-executing if it was the intent of the drafters that its provisions be effective without
further legislation. Comment, Criteria for Self-Executing Treaties, U. ILL. L.F. 238, 23940 (1968).
151. It was first suggested in Komlos that Article XVII merely created a presumption of liability that shifted the burden of proof and simplified the plaintiffs' recovery
procedure. See supra note 57.
152. The majority even recognized, " ... it is not literally inconsistent with [the
principle of] universal applicability to insist that a would-be plaintiff first find an appro- .
priate cause of action in the domestic law of a signatory.... " 572 F.2d at 917-18.
153. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, arts. XXI (contributory negligence of
passenger), XXIV(ii) (who has the right of action) XXV (standard by which carrier's
willful misconduct is defined), XVIII(ii) (questions of procedure), XXIX(ii) (limitation
of the time to sue). Two of these articles were not discussed by the Benjamins majority.
154. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. XXI.
155. [d. at art. XXIV.
156. [d. at art. XXII.
157. [d. at art. XXV.
158. Seth had never been cited prior to the Benjamin decision. However, in a district court decision in the same circuit as Seth, without citing Seth, the court held that
federal question jurisdiction was inapplicable. Fabiano Shoe Co. v. Alitalia Airlines, 380
F. Supp. 1400, 1403 (D. Mass. 1974).
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recto The Second Circuit asserted that since Seth held that a
cause of action is created under Article 30(3), the apparent purpose of the drafters was to create a cause of action throughout
the Convention. 1Ii9 In light of the conflicting language in Article
30(3) and Article 17, and the varied subject matter in the two
provisions, the Benjamins court's comparison is unwarranted.
Unlike Article 17, Article 30(3) is the only provision in the Convention which states when a passenger "shall have a right of
action. "160
Finally, the Benjamins court also misinterpreted the manner in which Great Britain implemented the Warsaw Convention. 161 The Second Circuit incorrectly assumed that the Convention and the Carriage by Air Act of 1932162 included the same
provisions. 163 The Carriage by Air Act consisted of two appended schedules, the first containing the text of the Convention
. and the second consisting of the wrongful death provisions. 1M
The text of the Act indicates that only a presumption of liability
arises from the Convention and that the provisions found in
Schedule Two were necessary to create a cause of action for
wrongful death. 166
The C~rriage by Air Act of 1961/66 which replaces the 1932
Act, conclusively demonstrates that Great Britain did not interpret Article 17 to create a cause of action. The 1961 Act provides
that the liability presumed in the Convention gives rise to a
cause of action created by statute. 167 The Benjamins majority,
neglecting to examine adequately the Carriage by Air Act,
reached the wrong conclusion.
The Ninth Circuit, in addition to relying on the Benjamins
reasoning, advanced further reasons why the decision should be
159. 572 F.2d at 918.
160. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. XXX(iii).
161. 572 F.2d at 919.
162. The Carriage by Air Act of 1932 22 & 23 Geo. 5, ch. 36, reprinted in, C. SHAWCROSS & K. BEAUMONT, AIR LAW 681-92 app. 2 (2d ed. 1951).
163. 572 F.2d at 918-19.
164. Provisions as to Liability of Carrier in the Event of the Death of a Passenger 22
& 23 Geo. 5, ch. 36, sched. 2 (1932), reprinted in, AIR LAW, supra note 162.

165. 1d.
166. 9 & 10 Eliz. 2 ch. 27. 1d. at app. B 53-71.

167. 1d.
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followed. The court deemed it unlikely that Article 17 created
only a presumption of liability.188 However, in the letter from
Secretary of State Cordell Hull to President Roosevelt describing the Convention, Hull stated that Article 17 creates only. a
presumption of liability.189 The court insisted that the importance of this letter is outweighed by the Convention drafters repeated statements of the need for a uniform set of rules to govern international air transportation. 170 Nevertheless, the
Convention contains substantial concessions to national law in
Articles 21, 22, 24 and 25,171 suggesting that the drafters intended to defer to the wrongful death statutes existing in· the
signatories' national laws.
.
The Ninth Circuit also incorrectly explained that Article
24(2) was the result of uncertainty among the Convention delegates regarding the attributes of the right they were creating. 172
The debates at the Rio Conference 173 conclusively demonstrate
that the Warsaw Convention was to apply to existing causes of
action for wrongful death and not to create new ones. 174 The Rio
debates indicate that the Convention delegates did not intend to .
interfere with wrongful death statutes existing at national law. m

o

The Ninth Circuit attached great significance to the
Moragne decision.178 In Moragne, the Supreme Court held that
a wrongful death action can be maintained without specific statutory authorization. 177 However, Moragne could be used as authority only if the Warsaw drafters had intended to create a
cause of action in Article 17. From the reasons delineated above,
it is apparent that no such intent existed. Therefore, the Convention cannot be used as a reference point for the right the
panel purports to create.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
'177.

708
See
708
See
708
See
[d.
[d.
708
398

F.2d at 412.
supra note 53.
F.2d at 415-16.
supra notes 154-57.
F.2d at 414.
Pogust, supra note 3, at 377.

F.2d at 414.
U.S. at 388-92.
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CONCLUSION

Although the Ninth Circuit reached a sound conclusion regarding the Federal Aviation Act in Mexico City Aircrash, the
court improperly concluded that Article 17 creates a private
right of action.
The court's reliance on the Benjamins decision is unjustified because of the distorted manner in which that court viewed
the provisions of the treaty. The Ninth Circuit, like the Benjamins court, erroneously interpreted the intentions of the Convention drafters. The court failed to adequately discuss the record of the Convention and its subsequent related conferences.
The court's analysis disregards the importance of determining
legislative intent through careful reasoned analysis.
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